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LEGAL AID-Lay Control and Organizational Complexity 
Render OEO Legal Service Program Unacceptable 
to New York Court-In re Community Action 
for Legal Services, Inc.* 
The Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) and the New York 
City Council Against Poverty approved the organization and the 
OEO funding of three legal service corporations as part of a com-
prehensive program to provide legal assistance to New York City's 
poor. According to the plan, the first corporation, Community Action 
for Legal Services, Inc. (CALS), was to approve proposed plans for 
setting up and operating neighborhood law offices with OEO funds 
and then to supervise and coordinate the agencies that sought to 
put those plans into operation.1 These agencies, operating as dele-
gates of CALS, and under subcontracts with it, were to hire attorneys 
to provide free legal services for indigents. One such delegate, the 
New York Legal Assistance Corporation (NYLAC), was to be 
created by the city for the purpose of establishing seven neighbor-
hood law offices. Another, the Harlem Assertion of Rights, Inc. 
(HAR), was to be organized by a neighborhood group and planned 
to establish five law offices in Harlem.2 In conformity with section 
280 of the New York Penal Law3 (recently reenacted as section 495 
of the New York Judiciary Law) prohibiting the practice of law 
by a corporation in the absence of special approval from the proper 
appellate division, CALS, NYLAC, and HAR submitted applica-
tions to the court for the necessary authorization. The court rejected 
the applications without prejudice to the prompt submission of 
• 26 App. Div. 2d 354, 274 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1966) [hereinafter cited as principal case]. 
I. CALS was also to establish "guidelines" for its delegate agencies, render as-
sistance and advice to them, audit their operations and finances, and develop research 
programs for the legal problems of the poor, legal education programs for indigents, 
and training programs for the lawyers and lay personnel of the delegate agencies. 
2. The presently established New York Legal Aid Society and Mobilization for 
Youth, Inc., as well as other groups to be formed, were also to provide legal services as 
delegates of CALS. 
3. This section was recently re-enacted as § 495 of the New York Judiciary Law 
and violation can lead to fines and conviction for misdemeanor. Section 280 of the old 
New York Penal Law read in part: 
1. No corporation or voluntary association shall 
(a) practice or appear as an attorney-at-law for any person in any court in the 
state or before any judicial body, nor 
(b) make it a business to practice as an attorney-at-law, for any person in any 
of said courts, nor 
(c) hold itself to the public as being entitled to practice law or to render legal 
services or advice. 
5. [N]or shall it apply to organizations organized for benevolent or charitable 
purposes, or for the purpose of assisting persons without means in the pursuit 
of any civil remedy, whose existence, organization or incorporation may be ap-
proved by the appellate division of the supreme court of the department in 
which the principal office of such corporation or voluntary association may be 
located. 
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amended proposals, basing its decision primarily upon the fear that 
the organizational complexity of the plan and the "lay control" of 
the corporations would endanger the professional standards of those 
attorneys involved in the program.4 
The court's concern with "lay control" stemmed from the plan 
to have representatives of the poor serve on the boards of the corpo-
rations. 5 Yet since Ia-wyers were to comprise a majority of the mem-
bership of the boards of both CALS and NYLAC, 6 it is not clear 
exactly what the court meant by "lay control." The opinion can 
be interpreted as requiring the complete exclusion of laymen from 
the executive staffs and directorates of the corporations.7 But such 
a requirement seems to conflict with other decisions regarding lay-
men and the charitable practice of law through a corporation, 8 and 
the appellate division cites nothing to counter this authority.9 
Canon 35 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which prohibits 
attorneys from submitting to outside lay interference in their client 
relationships,10 and state statutes like section 280, which bar corpo-
4. Principal case at 364, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 791. In addition to these two problems, 
which were designated as "major matters," the court raises "other issues." These in-
clude: "undefined gnidelines," "political, lobbying, and propagandistic activities," 
"referral or ineligible clients," "indiscriminate mingling of social goals and legitimate 
legal practice," "education," "group representation," "use of law students,'' and the 
court's own involvement. It is not clear from the opinion whether these "other issues" 
are merely gratuitous criticisms or underlying reasons for the rejection of the proposals. 
Principal case at 362-65, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 788-91. 
5. Principal case at 360, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 787. 
6. Twenty-three of the thirty-nvo member CALS board and thirteen of nventy on 
NYLAC's board were either required to be lawyers or were to be selected by courts, bar 
associations, or the bar controlled Legal Aid Society. HAR was required to have a 
minimum of six lawyers on its board of fifteen. Memorandum Submitted by the As-
sociation of the Bar of the City of New York at 16-17, 24, principal case. 
7. Principal case at 360, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 787: "[T]he executive staff, and those with 
responsibility to hire and discharge staff from the very top to the lowest lay echelon 
must be lawyers." In re Community Legal Services, Inc., No. 4969 (Pa. C.P. 4, June 30, 
1966) (Second Opinion 1967), the court thoroughly criticized the principal case and 
apparently assumed that the appellate division had required the exclusion of all 
laymen. "[T]his court is unable to agree that professional standards must fail of en-
forcement simply because some members of a legal assistance corporation, or even a 
majority of the members, happen not to be lawyers." Note, Neighborhood Law Offices: 
The New Wave in Legal Services for the Poor, 80 HARv. L. REv. 805, 838-39 (1967). 
8. In re Ades, 6 F. Supp. 467 (D. Md. 1934); Gunnels v. Atlanta Bar Ass'n, 191 Ga. 
366, 12 S.E.2d 602 (1940); Azzarello v. Legal Aid Soc'y, 117 Ohio App. 471, 185 N.E.2d 
566 (1962); In re Comunity Legal Services, Inc., No. 4968 (Pa. C.P. 4, June 30, 1966). 
9. The only case cited by the court is a one paragraph opinion which denied an 
application under § 280 to practice law as a corporation. In re Gandhi Soc'y for Human 
Rights, 17 App. Div. 2d 622 (1962). The court said the proposed corporation did not 
comply with the exception in § 280, and also quoted canon 35 of the Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics barring law intermediaries. Since both canon 35 and § 280 make exceptions 
for charitable or benevolent legal service groups for the poor, this authority does not 
seem compelling unless the court were to find that CALS, NYLAC, and HAR were not 
organized to help persons lacking means to pursue legal remedies without charge. 
10. Canon 35 Intermediaries. 
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by 
any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes benveen client and lawyer. 
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rate practice of law, were originally aimed at businesses and associa-
tions that sought to increase their patronage by providing legal 
services for customers or members.11 Underlying these prohibitions 
was the fear that when lawyers employed by lay associations work 
on projects other than those of general concern to the organization 
itself, they lose the independence which is traditionally a part of 
the attorney-client relationship. In dealing with the individual prob-
lems of client-members or customers the lawyer acts in the role of 
an employee dependent on the organization for which he works. 
Also, it was believed that involvement in the employer's organization 
would jeopardize the confidential relationship of lawyer and client, 
and that in serving two masters there would be a temptation to 
divide his allegiance when the interest in profits, power, or status 
of the lay intermediary paying him conflicted with the interests of 
the individual client. Finally, it was thought likely that lay organiza-
tions would degrade the legal profession by advertising lawyers' 
services and stirring up litigation.12 
A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications arc individual. He should avoid all re-
lations which direct the performance of his duties by or in the interest of such 
intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be direct to the client. 
Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigents are not deemed such inter-
mediaries. 
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association, 
club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter in which the 
organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment should not include 
the rendering of legal services to the members of such an organization in respect 
to their individual affairs. 
II. Examples of corporations illegally providing legal service for profit are (I) banks 
engaging in estate planning or drafting of trusts, notes, or mortgages [State Bar Ass'n 
v. Connecticut Bank &: Trust Co., 146 Conn. 556, 153 A.2d 453 (1959); People ex rel. 
Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931)]; 
(2) abstract and title insurance companies selling legal opinions on titles or drafting 
legal instruments [Klein v. Chicago Title 8: Trust Co., 295 Ill. App. 208, 14 N.E.2d 852 
(1938); Hexter Title & Abstract Co. v. Grievance Comm., 142 Texas 506, 179 S.W.2d 946 
(19-14); see Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 184 (1962)]; (3) credit agencies undertaking law suits to 
collect the debts due another [Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. Bar Ass'n, 167 
Va. 327, 189 S.E. 153 (1937)]. Examples of nonprofit group associations illegally ob-
taining legal service for its members are (1) motor clubs providing counsel for their 
members [People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 Ill. 50, 199 
N.E. I (1935)]; (2) landowners or tenants organizing to protect their rights against a 
tax [People ex rel. Courtney v. Association of Real Estate Taxpayers, 354 Ill. 102, 187 
N.E. 823 (1933)]; (3) unions hiring attorneys for their members [Illinois State Bar Ass'n 
v. United Mine Workers, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503 (Ill. 1966), rev'd, 36 U.S.L.W. 
4048 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1967); see Hildebrand v. State Bar, 36 Cal. 2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 
(1950); In re Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958). 
See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 162 (1953); Annot., 157 A.L.R. 282 (1945)]. 
12. This would result in lay groups performing acts which a lawyer is forbidden 
to do under canons 27 and 28. Canon 27 provides in part: 
Advertising, Direct or Indirect. 
It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by circulars, advertise• 
ments, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted 
by personal relations. Indirect advertisements for professional employment such 
as furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments, or procuring his photograph to be 
published in connection with causes in which the lawyer has been or is engaged 
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In a charitable legal service organization these dangers are mini-
mized or overcome altogether. The absence of pressure to produce 
a profit or expand membership precludes the danger of commercial 
exploitation. Moreover, the likeliest area of conflict-that of the 
pecuniary interests of the organization as opposed to those of the 
customer or member-is greatly limited,13 with corresponding re-
ductions in the dangers of interference with the attorney's inde-
pendence and the confidential relationship between lawyer and 
client. In fact, one of the purposes of legal aid groups is to foster 
these very things and thereby upgrade the professional role. For 
these reasons, and because of the great public good accomplished by 
such groups, courts, ethics committees, and statutes have traditionally 
exempted such associations from bans on lay intermediaries and 
corporate practice of law. Even the customary prohibitions on ad-
vertising, solicitation, and stirring up litigation have been rela.xed 
when the purpose of such activities is to represent the rights of the 
poor.14 
Possibly the appellate division ignored this traditional approach 
because of the one obvious conflict of interest which is not pre-
cluded by the elimination of the profit motive: the long-range goals 
or concerning the manner of their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, 
the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudation, offend the 
traditions and lower the tone of our profession and are reprehensible; but the 
customary use of simple professional cards is not improper. 
Canon 28 provides in part: 
Stirring Up Litigation, Directly or Through Agents. 
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit, except in 
rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his duty to do so. 
Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional, but it is indictable at 
common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in titles or other causes of 
action and inform thereof in order to be employed to bring suit or collect judg-
ment, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries 
or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients. 
13. In NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438-43 (1963), Justice Brennan emphasized 
the element of private or pecuniary gain at which canons 27, 28, and 35 were aimed. 
He further stated that there was no serious danger of "professionally reprehensible 
conflicts of interests" with the activities undertaken by the NAACP, reasoning that 
"[t]his is so partly because no monetary stakes are involved, and so there is no danger 
that the attorney will desert or subvert the paramount interests of his client to enrich 
himself or an outside sponsor." 371 U.S. at 443. 
Notwithstanding Justice Brennan's optimism for the NAACP, it must be admitted 
that in the legal aid context a removal of the profit motive will not completely elimi-
nate the occasions for conflicts of interest, although it may greatly reduce them. Not 
only may the goals of the organization conflict with the immediate goals and interests 
of the client, but the interests of directors--or, in the case of lawyer directors, the 
interests of their clients-as well as the interests of representatives of the poor may also 
conflict with those of the person being served. The canons conceptually should guard 
against conflicts involving the lawyers, but they do not apply to lay directors. This may 
explain the appellate division's concern over only the lay directors and not the lawyer 
directors. Interview with Prof. James White, University of Michigan Law School, Ann 
Arbor, Oct. 20, 1967. 
14. American Bar Association, Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics 
and Grievances, Nos. 148 (1935), 205 (1940), 227 (1941). 
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of the organization may still be opposed to the immediate interests 
of the individual client. This potential danger has generally been 
the reason advanced for prohibiting the practice of law by nonprofit 
organizations which do not serve charitable purposes.16 Certainly it 
must be admitted that the plan under consideration in the principal 
case could have resulted in just this type of conflict, and that because 
of this conflict lay directors, ignorant of professional standards and 
not subject to judicial sanctions for misconduct, might have inter-
fered with an attorney's handling of a particular case. However, if 
this is what troubled the court, it could have at least given the OEO 
and CALS an opportunity to show that the lawyer-dominated board 
had retained sufficient control to insure the maintenance of profes-
sional standards.16 Moreover, if the plan submitted did prove un-
satisfactory in this respect, alternatives far less drastic than the total 
exclusion of laymen were available. For example, the standards of 
legal ethics could be incorporated in the charters of the corporations 
and the boards given the necessary power to enforce them. If the 
court were still dissatisfied, the legislature could enact a statute re-
quiring observance of professional standards by lay directors and 
expanding the jurisdiction of the appellate division to enable it to 
discipline violators.17 
15. See examples of nonprofit groups prohibited from practicing law in note 11 
supra. 
16. It seems that if each lawyer were acting professionally he would report and 
resist any adverse interference by a lay director or any other party. While canon 35 
(quoted in note IO supra) excludes charitable societies rendering legal aid from its 
condemnation of law intermediaries, any individual lay director not officially acting for 
the whole group would not be within this e.xception, and thus his interference would 
not be allowed under canon 35 and should be resisted. Canons 6 and 8 would seem to 
require complete disclosure to the client concerning the prospects and merits of his 
cause, the advisability of pursuing it, and any possible conflict between the goals and 
aims of the group as a whole and his immediate interest: 
Canon 6. Adverse Influences and Conflicting interests. 
It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all 
the circumstances of his relations to the parties, and any interest in or connec-
tion with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of 
counsel. 
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express con-
sent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning 
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflictin~ interests when, in behalf of one 
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires 
him to oppose. 
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to 
divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of re-
tainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest 
of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed. 
Canon 8 provides in part: 
Advising Upon the Merits of a Client's Cause. 
A lawyer should endeavor to obtain full knowledge of his client's cause before 
advising thereon, and he is bound to give a candid opinion of the merits and 
probable result of pending or contemplated litigation .•.. "Whenever the contro-
versy will admit of fair adjustment, the client should be advised to avoid or to 
end the litigation. 
17. Florida allows attorneys to form legal practice corporations, but any deviation 
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As a result of its excessive concern with the evils of lay partici-
pation, the court apparently failed to recognize the desirability of 
having the poor represented on the governing boards. The court 
did encourage the use of the poor on advisory committees,18 and 
thus acknowledged the usefulness of seeking advice from those who 
best know the needs, aspirations, and limitations of the poor. How-
ever, no attention was given to the need for structuring the means 
of articulating such advice so as to insure reception and response 
by the policymakers. Arguably, this could best be done by repre-
sentation of the poor on the governing boards. Relegation to a 
mere advisory capacity, as proposed by the court, creates the danger 
that the voice of the poor would be unsolicited, unheard, and eventu-
ally inaudible. In addition, a mere advisory status would probably 
hinder participation by the poor as a true and equal partner in work-
ing to overcome their problems and replace meaningful involvement 
with tokenism, thereby reducing those being aided to the resented 
and dependent status of passive donees. 
Of course, effective representatives of the poor may be difficult 
to find: those who serve may not assert their views or attend meet-
ings. For this and other reasons, it has been contended that partici-
pation by the poor on governing boards is unnecessary.19 Yet, even 
assuming that the poor presently lack the ability to participate 
effectively, the concept seems at least worthy of a trial period. The 
presence of representatives of the poor cannot greatly impair a 
board's ability to act, and may in fact provide an opportunity and 
encouragement to such representatives to gain experience and be-
come more active in advising and directing.20 Indeed, Congress 
might well have recognized this possibility when it insisted on "maxi-
mum feasible participation of residents of the area and members 
of the group to be served"21 in all OEO projects. Congress recently 
from the canons or any unfaithful or unethical conduct by the corporation or its mem• 
hers are still within the control and discipline of the court. See In re Florida Bar, 133 
S.2d 554 (Fla. 1961). 
18. Principal case at 361, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 787. 
19. Prof. White stated that this experience on two legal aid boards and the experi-
ence of other boards with which he was familiar cast doubt on the idea that sub-
stantial lay representation of the poor was a necessary ingredient of an effective 
program. He suggested that the attitudes of the lawyer board members and the attitude 
and legal skill of the lawyer employees seemed to be much more important deter-
minants of the program's quality. However, Prof. White stated that it was too early 
to conclude that lay representation was unnecessary or unimportant and that such 
representation should be continued at least until solid evidence shows that lay repre-
sentation has no value. 
20. See In re Community Legal Services, Inc., No. 4968 (Pa. C.P. 4, June 30, 1966); 
Note, supra note 7, at 828-29 (1967); note 19 supra. 
21. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2782 (Supp. I, 1965), amending 
42 u.s.c. § 2782 (1964). 
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interpreted "maximum feasible participation" as meaning a one-
third representation of the poor on the boards of community action 
programs.22 Although this requirement may bind only the primary 
community action board,23 it can be read to apply to a delegate 
legal service board. Clearly, the rationale behind the requirement 
seems equally applicable to both. 
In light of the "maximum feasible participation" requirement, 
the appellate division's apparent exclusion of all laymen from the 
delegate boards may have imperiled the OEO financing of the New 
York program for legal services. Possibly this threatened loss of 
funds, or consideration of the underlying reasons for lay participa-
tion, caused the appellate division recently to retreat from the strong 
language in its opinion; the court has recently approved a resubmit-
ted proposal that includes one-third lay involvement on the boards.24 
Unfortunately, this approval is unlikely to result in a published 
opinion,26 and thus nothing will appear in the reporter system that 
expressly overrules the position apparently taken in the principal 
case. Such a precedent against lay involvement by a most respected 
court has already served as a weapon for attacking participation by 
the poor on legal service boards.26 
The court was also unconvincing in its other major objection, 
which was that the structure of the proposed program was so com-
plex, interrelated, and overlapping as to render ineffective any pro-
fessional or disciplinary supervision.27 Since there are penal and 
22. Section 203, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2782 (Supp. Feb. 1967). One-third poor representation 
was the interpretation of "maximum feasible participation" on boards even before this 
amendment. See, e.g., Pye, The Role of Legal Services in the Antipoverty Program, 
31 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 211, 225 (1966). In § 210, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2785 (Supp. Feb. 
1967), Congress further encourages participation of the poor on directorates by pro-
viding allowances and expenses for their attending meetings. 
23. Each city has a primary community action board which oversees all aspects of 
any OEO program in that city. Also, each area of the OEO program, such as the 
legal service division or the job training program, has its own board which generally 
operates under this primary board. The Congressional requirement may only appiy 
to this primary board. Student writers in the Harvard Law Review point out that the 
legislative history of this amendment "indicates that this requirement applies only 
to the 'umbrella' agency and not to legal services. CONFERENCE REP. No. 2298, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG, & An. NEWS 6052, 6055." 
Note, supra note 7, at 829 n.134 (1967). 
24. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1967, at 1, col. 6. 
25. It is more likely that the appellate division will merely approve the applications 
without an opinion. 
26. The opinion was presented to block a Philadelphia proposal, but was rejected 
and rebutted in an excellent opinion by Judge Alexander in In re Community Legal 
Services, Inc., No. 4968 (Pa. C.P., second Opinion, 1967). The New York decision was 
also presented in an attempt by the Stanislaus County Bar Association to enjoin the 
activities of California Rural Legal Assistance, Inc., but this case has not, as of this 
writing, been decided. Stanislaus County Bar Ass'n v. California Rural Legal Assistance, 
Inc., No. 93302 (Calif. Super. Ct., Jan. 20, 1967). 
27. Principal case at 359-60, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 786-87. 
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civil sanctions applicable to lawyers on the boards or in neighbor-
hood offices who might act unethically or submit to lay interfer-
ence, 28 it is doubtful that the court's concern was with the lack of 
capacity to administer discipline. More likely, its criticism was 
focused on the practical problem of detecting and pinpointing un-
ethical behavior in "such a diffusion of managerial responsibility."29 
Yet the court's demand for "directorates of sufficiently small size, 
palpable groups amenable to its discipline and sanction,"30 and for 
only one legal assistance corporation for each area,31 seems not to 
facilitate policing. Assuming that a given number of attorneys will 
be hired with OEO funds regardless of whether there are few or 
many organizations, or whether the boards are large or small, it 
should not be more difficult to determine the source of an ethical 
violation if there are two organizations in the area rather than one, 
or if the boards are large rather than small. In fact, it might be 
harder for the guilty to camouflage their transgressions from a large 
board, since more innocent parties would have to be deceived, or 
at least persuaded to countenance the deviant act. Of course, if 
limiting the number of associations per area or the size of the 
boards reduces the number of la·wyers in the program, and thus the 
occasions for violations, easier policing would probably be assured. 
However, it is doubtful that this uncertain gain is worth the resulting 
loss to the program as a whole. Smaller boards would lack the di-
versity of talent, specialties, and perspective, as well as the balance 
and autonomy that a larger board can provide.32 Moreover, there 
may be an advantage in having more than one organization in an 
area that is populated by various ethnic groups.33 Also, it is conceiv-
able that the competition between groups to provide the best service 
in the area might not be wasteful, as the court assumes, but rather 
might generate efficiency. Thus, the action of the appellate division, 
based as it was on mere speculation, seems to have been somewhat 
premature. 
A lack of empirical data often induces a court to resort to gen-
eralities, such as maintaining the sanctity of legal ethics, as the 
grounds for its decision. A recent survey by Professor Jerome Carlin 
of the New Yark Bar, concerning lawyers' ethics, seems to indicate 
that in the principal case that approach resulted in an opinion which 
does not reflect social reality.34 The survey confirms the view that in 
28. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAw § 90 (McKinney 1948); N.Y. PEN. LAW §§ 270-71, 273 
(McKinney 1944). 
29. Principal case at 361, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 787. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 360, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 786. 
32. Pye, supra note 22, at 228. 
33. In re Community Legal Services, No. 4968, (Pa. C.P., second opinion, June 30, 
1966). 
34. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS (1966). 
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the lower echelons of the bar, where many ill-trained and financially 
insecure attorneys serve, professional violations are commonplace.35 
The highly competitive nature of the practice of law at this level 
provides an inducement to la·wyers to commit ethical violations in 
order to obtain clients.36 La·wyers not only solicit but often yield to 
client pressures to represent their causes in unethical ways.37 Also, 
the uninformed client, if he is not a prospect for future business, 
is an easy target for exploitation.38 Additionally, the courts and 
agencies before which these marginal lawyers practice have informal 
procedures and are at times susceptible to a bribe or political favor.39 
Finally, Carlin asserts that the marginal lawyer, unlike his counter-
part in the big firm, rarely receives the support and encouragement 
of colleagues who are committed to higher standards.40 Indeed, any 
colleagueship he may have is likely to reinforce his illicit behavior. 
To correct this intolerable situation Professor Carlin recom-
mends the establishment of group legal services.41 Legal aid corpora-
35. Id. at 11-37, 41-61. In a review of Carlin's book, John A. Young criticizes the 
means by which Carlin selected his questions for determining what was ethical. 76 
YALE L.J. 1247 (1967). Thus, the questions asked concerned ethical violations that less 
secure attorneys were more likely to encounter and transgress and did not relate to 
unethical conduct in which secure, large-firm attorneys would be likely to engage--
namely, that resulting from conflicts of interest, suppression or destruction of evidence, 
use of political influence to name a judge, or even giving advice for the commission of 
a fraud. Nevertheless, Erwin 0. Smigel, author of THE WALL STREET LAWYER (1964), 
affirms Carlin's findings that the large-law-firm lawyers were more likely to act ethically 
since many of their clients would tolerate nothing less. Book Review, 76 YALE L.J. 
1253, 1254 (1967). 
The results of studies concerning both the quality and quantity of attorneys that 
arc available to serve the middle class and the poor are appalling. It has been estimated 
that only 10% of the poor needing legal help are presently receiving it. Carlin & 
Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.CL.A.L. REv. 381 410 (1965). 
In addition to questionable dependability, the inaccessibility and high cost of attorneys, 
plus the layman's ignorance of his own legal problems, arc the primary reasons that 
these classes get inadequate legal services. Free legal services for the poor as a matter 
of right and group legal services for the middle class are being recommended to im-
prove this situation by both Carlin and others. See generally J. CARLIN, LAWYERS ON 
THEIR OwN (1962); E. CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED (1963); E. SMIGEL, supra 
note 35; Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 
381 (1965); Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services; The Responsibility of the Indi-
vidual Law and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438 (1965); Cheatham, A 
Lawyer When Needed; Legal Services for the 11Iiddle Classes, 63 CoLuM. L. REv. 973 
(1965); Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles, and Poultices and Cures, 5 LAw & CONTEMP. 
PRon. 104 (1938); Pye, supra note 22; Schwartz, Foreword: Group Legal Services in 
Prospective, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 279 (1965); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in 
Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J. 545 (1967). For an author who feels the situation is not as 
others have urged, see Simpson, Group Legal Services: The Case for Caution, 12 
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 327 (1965). 
36. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 66-71 (1966). 
37. Id. at 73-76. 
38. Id. at 71-73. 
39. Id. at 84-94. 
40. Id. at 110-15. 
41. Id. at 176-82. 
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tions such as GALS, NYLAC, and HAR, rather than acting as a 
hindrance, can be helpful in upgrading the professional conduct of 
many members of the bar. First, the market for legal services is 
expanded by bringing in the many poor not being served today, 
and this should reduce the competition for clients.42 In addition, 
OEO financing would remove the major cause of ethical violations 
by providing some measure of economic security, and the better 
salaries should also attract some more responsible and skilled at-
torneys into this type of legal practice.43 Through the intermingling 
of a few relatively qualified attorneys in each legal aid office, and 
the appointment by the bar of principled practitioners to the direc-
torates, higher standards of performance could be set and the big 
firm colleagueship that reinforces professional conduct provided. 
Finally, ethically committed attorneys, subject to fewer temptations 
and no longer dependent on local politicians or businessmen for 
support, could more readily resist and challenge the deviant acts 
of other practitioners, lower courts, and agencies, and thereby im-
prove practice and procedure at this level.44 Thus, instead of pre-
senting a threat to professional standards as the appellate division 
suggested, legal aid offers the possibility of improving the profes-
42. Id. at 180. Not only would many poor persons, who without legal aid could not 
afford an attorney, now use one, but there would also be a corresponding increase in 
the need for legal services on the other side since matters previously settled by default 
would now be contested. Moreover, those attorneys representing the other side may 
find that their retainers set for uncontested legal services are now inadequate in light 
of the greater amount of work required. 
43. Id. at 180-81. 
44. Id. at 181. Numerous alternative plans have been suggested in dealing with the 
problem of legal services for the poor. The traditional bar-controlled legal aid society, 
with its central location and service orientation, has often proved too inaccessible and 
narrow in scope for many indigents, and today the neighborhood law office represents 
an attempt to bring legal services into geographical proximity to the poor. See generally 
Abrahams, Twenty-Five Years of Service: Philadelphia Neighborhood Law Office Plan, 
50 A.B.A.J. 728 (1964); Grosser, The Need for a Neighborhood Legal Service and the 
New York Experience, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 146 (1965). OEO funds have made great 
expansion of these programs possible. The potential of the neighborhood law office 
to go beyond the mere service function and seek reforms and social progress was ex-
plored by the present Special Assistant to the Director of the OEO, Edgar S. Cahn, and 
his wife in The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE L.J. 1317 (1964). 
Recently, after several hundred neighborhood offices have been operating or funded, 
the Cahns have expressed great dismay that these offices are becoming mere service 
agencies, and fail to seek reform and attack the roots of poverty. After a brilliant attack 
upon our outdated and ineffective "Justice Industry," they suggest further alternatives 
such as: the use of non-lawyers to perform many functions now limited to attorneys; 
the neighborhood court system; interdisciplinary, crisis-orientated teams; and neighbor-
hood law corporations owned by the people. Cahn &: Cahn, What Price Justice: The 
Civilian Perspective Revisited, 41 NoTRE DA.ME LAw 927 (1966). Lawyer referral and 
group legal services are other means of making legal service more readily available to 
the middle class, but this fails to help the poor. See generally Christensen, Lawyer Re-
ferral Service: An Alternative to Lay-Group Legal Service?, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 341 
(1966); Comment, The Unauthorized Practice of Law by Laymen and Lay Associations, 
54 CALIF. L. REv. 1331 (1966). For a prediction of the legal changes in our system, see 
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 298-305. 
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sional performance of la·wyers in an area where it has been embar-
rassingly poor. 
It is rather ironic that the court was even concerned with the 
detection of ethical violations, since Professor Carlin indicated that 
neither the bar nor the appellate division makes a significant attempt 
to police and prosecute such occurrences anyway.45 Only 25% of all 
individual practitioners polled in his survey (many of whom make 
up the lower echelon of the bar) were deemed strict conformers to 
ethical standards.46 On the other hand, 47% fluctuated in their con-
formance and 30% were habitual violators.47 Yet of the estimated 
4,500 serious violations which occur in New York each year only an 
average of 85, or less than 2%, are submitted to any official disci-
plinary machinery, and of these only 0.02% are sanctioned by dis-
barment, suspension, or censure.48 Moreover, between 1951 and 
1962 the Grievance Committee of the New York City Bar handled 
a yearly average of 1,450 complaints against la·wyers, but of these 
only 4% ever reached a formal hearing before the Grievance Com-
mittee and only 19 per year, on the average, were recommended for 
court prosecution.40 Thus, the survey shows that those entrusted 
with maintaining professional standards have all but abdicated their 
responsibility except in those instances where a case receives much 
notoriety or publicity.50 These results indicated to Carlin that disci-
plinary controls and formal sanctions have in the past been aimed 
less at scrutinizing moral integrity and ethical conformity, as the 
opinion in the principal case would suggest, than at forestalling 
public criticism which might endanger the legal profession's monop-
oly in the market for legal services.51 
The appellate division's use of its power under section 280 to 
second guess the New York City Council Against Poverty and the 
OEO and to attempt to exclude laymen from the governing boards 
and to limit the number of directorates and agencies per area is 
thus open to criticism. The decision appears especially unreasonable 
in light of the availability of other remedies which would have been 
less impeding to the total effectiveness of the program while still 
45. J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 150-62 (1966). 
46. Id. at 55. 
·!7. Id. 
48. Id. at 160. 
49. Id. at 151. Canon 29 makes it a lawyer's duty to expose unprofessional conduct. 
The last major book on legal ethics also revealed that much justified criticism should 
be directed at the reluctant portion of the bar and judges who fail to expose abuses 
or to demand reprimand, suspension, or disbarment. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 59 
(1953). 
50. Id. at 151. 
51. Id. at 180. For other criticism of the legal profession's monopoly, see Cahn &: 
Cahn, supra note 44, at 927-40; Johnstone, The Unauthorized Practice Controversy, A 
Struggle Among Power Groups, 4 KAN. L. REv. 1, 5 (1955). 
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providing adequate safeguards against the dangers apparently trou-
bling the court. However, a new proposal has been accepted, 52 and 
thus; although the power exercised by the court has resulted in a 
delay in furnishing the poor with needed legal services, a partial 
loss of OEO funds, and possibly an atmosphere of apprehension that 
could limit the effectiveness of the program, the needed services will 
soon be provided. But what of another court that is unsympathetic 
to the concept of a legal aid program? It could use similar statutory 
power as a weapon against such programs, continually tefusing to 
approve applications ort the basis of general references to unspecified 
dangers to the legal profession. In view of receht Supreme Court 
decisions casting the halo of first amendment guarantees about 
certain group activities relating to litigation, it is arguable that this 
sort of judicial action might be unconstitutional. 
In National Association for the Advancement of Colored People 
v. Button,53 the Supreme Court held that the application of a Vir-
ginia anti-solicitation statute to the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People (NAACP), which was seeking out 
individuals and representing them in desegregation suits, was an 
unconstitutional interference with first and fourteenth amendment 
rights of expression and association. The Court emphasized the fact 
that the NAACP used law suits riot merely to vindicate individual 
claims, but to foster the principle of desegregation and Negro 
equality.M The Court viewed this type of litigation as a form of 
political expression and association which was a more effective 
political tool for the Negro minority under certain circumstances 
than attempting to influence the outcome of elections.55 While the 
majority of the Court recognized that solicitation was subject to 
state regulation, it found no compelling state interest in the con-
tested situation that justified prohibiting the NAACP's actions since 
they were not of the malicious, profit-seeking, or oppressive nature 
against which solicitation bars were directed.56 Thus, the decision 
made it clear that the first amendment protects litigation that serves 
a political purpose from interference by references to vague and un-
specified fears about professional misconduct. 
More recently, in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia 
ex rel Virginia State Bar,57 the Court upheld the constitutional right 
of a union to refer its members to attorneys of known competence 
so that they might pursue Federal Employees Liability Act and 
Safety Appliance Act claims. The majority reasoned that a statute 
52. N.Y.L.J., Oct. 13, 1967, at 1, col. 6. 
53. 371 U.S. 415 (1963). 
54. Id. at 428-31. 
55. Id. at 429. 
56. Id. at 438-43. 
57. 377 U.S. I (1964). 
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against solicitation could not be invoked to prevent union members 
from exercising their constitutional freedoms of "speech, petition 
and assembly"58 to join together in the form of a union and choose 
officers who thereafter may advise them or their families on prospec-
tive litigation and the selection of an able attorney. The union's 
activities, though in no way political, fostered rights concerning 
personal injuries which were created by Congress. The majority 
again found no compelling state interest that warranted limiting the 
first amendment rights involved in the union's activities, since the 
referral system of the union did not entail the traditional dangers 
of commercialization or "ambulance chasing."59 
In light of the Button and Brotherhood decisions, legal aid 
organizations, such as those set up by CALS, NYLAC, or HAR, 
might be in a position to argue that their activities also £all within 
first amendment protections. 6° Congress has stated that its goal in 
all programs set up under the Economic Opportunity Act is not 
merely to provide services £or the poor, but to attack the problems 
and causes of poverty.61 As a result, the OEO legal services program 
has been justified and interpreted as being organized not simply to 
redress separate individual grievances, but also to use legal servic~s 
as a means of combating poverty and its causes. 62 In £act, the OEO 
Guidelines require each legal service program to adopt the goal of 
legal reform.63 To this end legal aid groups have undertaken test 
cases and legislative work, including research, drafting, testifying, 
and even lobbying in some instances.64 In addition, legal service 
organizations have engaged in community education by means of 
information cards and speeches, the training of legal and nonprofes-
sional personnel, and the gathering of statistics to evaluate the pro-
gram's effect in countering poverty problems.65 I£ the NAACP's use 
of some of these procedures, including the institution of litigation, 
to free Negroes from the restraints of segregation can be considered 
58. Id. at 5-6. 
59. Id. at 6. 
60. Other writers have also indicated that the Button and Brotherhood cases have 
opened the way to first amendment protections for legal aid groups and other group 
legal services. See Bodle, Group Legal Services: The Case for the BRT, 12 U.CL.A.L. 
REv. 306, 322-25 (1965); Cheatham, Availablity of Legal Services: The Responsibility 
of the Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 438, 453 (1965); 
Schwartz, supra note 35, at 305; Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 
76 YALE L.J. 966 (1967); Note, 41 NOTRE DAME LAw. 961, 970 (1966). 
61. Economic Opportunity Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2701 (1964). 
62. See, e.g., Cahn & Cahn, The War on Poverty: A Civilian Perspective, 73 YALE 
L.J. 1317 (1964); Grosser, supra note 44; Pye, supra note 22; Note, supra npte 7. 
See also § 215, 80 Stat. 1462 (1966), quoted in part in note 72 infra. 
63. OEO, GUIDELINES FOR LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAMS 23 (1966). 
64. Note, supra note 7, at 813-22. 
65. Id. 
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political activity that aids a racial minority group, it seems that the 
activities performed by the neighborhood legal service organizations 
could similarly be deemed political since their ultimate goal is to 
free an economic minority group from the restraints of landlord 
oppression, merchant exploitation, and governmental injustices.66 
Assuming a court would accept this argument, those persons in-
corporating the legal aid group, or those who direct it, could seem-
ingly claim first amendment protections similar to those of the 
NAACP. In Button, it was not the members and nonmembers of 
the NAACP receiving legal services whose rights were violated, but 
rather the violation was of the rights of those members who sought 
to provide these services. 67 And, these persons, like the incorporators 
and board of a legal service corporation, were not necessarily of the 
same social or economic background as those being served.68 
Even if a court ruled that OEO legal aid corporations, because 
they are primarily service organizations, are not sufficiently political60 
to be analogous to the NAACP in Button, first amendment guaran-
tees may nevertheless be available to these groups. An argument to 
this effect can be based upon a factual analogy to Brotherhood, with 
its nonpolitical personal injury claims. Such an analogy is, of course, 
less direct than the political analogy to Button, since the union in 
Brotherhood, unlike a legal service corporation, did not hire at-
torneys directly. However, in UMW v. Illinois State Bar Associa-
tion, 10 the Supreme Court has recently authorized the direct hiring 
of attorneys by a union to handle workmen's compensation suits for 
the union members.71 Whether attorneys could also be hired for 
suits less related to the functions of the organization, such as divorce 
or criminal suits, as legal aid attorneys would undertake, was 
not stated, but in light of the decision it seems likely that these too 
would be authorized. This decision also made it clear that the fact 
that the rights enforced in Brotherhood were congressionally created 
was irrelevant.72 Therefore, first amendment guarantees cover liti-
gation over both state and federal claims. 
66. Note, 41 NoTRE DAME I.Aw. 961, 970 (1966). See note 60 supra. 
67. 371 U.S. 415, 418, 420 (1963). 
68. It could be argued that unlike the Button and Brotherhood situation, most 
OEO legal service groups operate under a grant of authority from the state govern• 
ment with federal financing and would be in no position to argue that the same state 
government is unconstitutionally limiting its authority to provide services. 
69. Section 202, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2782 (Supp. Feb. 1967), declares that OEO programs 
cannot be used for partisan political activity or for election of any candidate for public 
office. The problem is whether the over-all activities are sufficiently political in a non-
partisan sense for first amendment protections. 
70. 36 U.S.L.W. 4048 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1967). This opinion was handed down after 
this Note had gone to publication and is an expansion of the Brotherhood decision. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 4050 n.5. § 215, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2792 (Supp. Feb. 1967), states in part: 
In carrying out sections 204 and 205, the Director shall carry out programs eligible 
for assistance under such sections, which provide legal advice and legal representa-
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The most troublesome difficulty with the analogy to Brotherhood 
concerns whose first amendment rights are being violated. In that 
case the workers receiving the advice and the elected representatives 
providing it were all union members73 who voluntarily chose to join 
a union so that they could function as a unit. The act of associating 
in this form in turn engendered the constitutional right of the 
elected "wisest counsel" to advise as to the most effective way of 
petitioning the government through the courts.74 Although the poor 
of a neighborhod are members of a group defined by a geographical 
locus and economic status, rather than by a job and bargaining unit, 
the fact remains that they usually have made no attempt to assemble, 
confer, or seek advice on petitioning the courts. They, therefore, 
have performed no act protected under the Constitution.75 How-
ever, it might still be arguable that the incorporators and those who 
will participate on the boards of legal aid groups, a portion of whom 
will be representatives or "wisest counsel" of the poor, are perform-
ing constitutionally protected acts. They do assemble to advise and 
petition the government through the courts; and they are the rep-
resentatives of a group which has proved ineffective in asserting its 
own rights. 76 
If a court also rejects the factual analogy to Brotherhood, there 
might be yet another approach to the first amendment question. It 
tion to persons when they are unable to afford the services of a private attorney, 
together with legal research and information as appropriate to mobilize the 
assistance of lawyers and legal institutions, or combinations thereof, to further the 
cause of justice among persons living in poverty. 
73. 377 U.S. I, 4-6 (1964). The advice was given to the union member if alive, 
or his widow and children. Id. at 4. 
74. Id. at 5-7. 
75. The court in Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. UMW, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 219 N.E.2d 503, 
508, 510 (Ill. 1966), rev'd, 36 U.S.L.W. 4048 (U.S. Dec. 5, 1967), indicates in dicta that 
there might be a constitutional violation if indigents' rights were being represented. 
Judge Alexander in his second opinion in In re Community Legal Services, Inc., No. 
•1968 (Pa. C.P. 4, June 30, 1966), (Second Opinion, 1967), at 123, also suggests that the 
poor may have constitutional rights to petition the courts, and that these are at stake: 
While the present case concerns the incorporation of Community Legal Services to 
provide services to those who live in the area of "poverty" and to low income 
citizens, the right of those citizens to petition the courts and otherwise to speak 
and associate thus to secure redress of grievances are, of course, at stake here. 
The incorporators of Community Legal Services may properly raise the constitu-
tional rights of these citizens: Griswold v. Connecticut, !HS U.S. 479, 481 (1965); 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
Zimroth argues that in Button not only the legal service program of the NAACP was 
protected, but that the opinion can be read as either giving any person the right to 
be a plaintiff in a suit or recognizing a constitutionally protected right to litigate. 
Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966 (1967). 
76. When litigation itself is not a form of political expression as it was in Button, 
the question remains as to whether the lawyers have a constitutional right to petition 
government for redress of the separate grievances of others. Some authorities believe that 
the poor may have a special right to litigation. See authorities cited in note 75 supra. 
Although there are no cases upholding such a right, the same deference given to the 
poor might aUow attorneys to claim first amendment protections when representing 
this group. 
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seems that Button and Brotherhood together have created a novel 
and presently undelineated area of first amendment protections con-
cerning litigation, and that the penumbra of this protection may 
extend to include charitcl-ble legal service organizations.77 That is, 
regardless of factual similarities to the legal aid context, the two 
cases may indicate a trend which will culminate in the recognition 
of legal service corporations as another group that exercises first 
amendment rights when it assembles to assert either political or non-
political claims for others who are unq.ple meaningfully to assert 
their own rights.78 
Assuming, arguendo, that the activities of neighborhood law 
offices are protected by the first amendment, the next question is 
whether the application of a New York type statute would be an 
unconstitutional interference with these activities. This question 
seemingly should be answered in the affinnative, at least in the con-
text of the principal case. There is a clear parallel between the 
appellate divisio11's denial of the petitions because of vaguely de-
fined potential dangers to professional standards which might result 
from the organizatio11al structure of the legal services program and 
the Virginia court's prohibiting the activities of the NAACP and 
the union on the l:,asis of similar fears as to the effect of solicitation 
on professional standards. Moreover, in the principal case, as in the 
nvo Virginia cases, the traditional threats to professional standards 
caused by profit seeking were absent and there was no mention of 
any other compelling interest which would justify interference with 
rights protected by the first amendment. 
There are two additional problems with the constitutional argu-
ment. The first stems from the fact that the appellate division's re-
fusal to approve the plan would not prohibit poor individuals from 
l)ringing their own suits nor would it prevent lawyers from joining 
together in partnership form to give free services to the poor. There-
fore, such court action would not theoretically prevent the adjudi-
cation of the rights of the poor or association to encourage the 
assertion of those rights. In Button and Brotherhood, however, al-
though the Virginia antisolicitation statute similarly did not 
expressly prohibit individuals from bringing desegregation or per-
sonal injury suits, it was nevertheless held unconstitutional as 
applied. The Court recognized the impact of the effective practical 
restraints created by a dearth of lawyers willing to represent Negroes 
in Button79 and the experiences of union members with incom-
petent or dishonest attorneys in Brotherhood.80 A similar practical 
77. See notes 60 8e 75 supra. 
78. See notes 60, 75 8e 76 supra. 
79. fl7l U.S. 415, 435-36 (1963). 
80. 377 U.S. I, 3-4 {1964). 
December 1967] Recent Developments 405 
restraint would seemingly result from prohibiting groups seeking to 
provide free legal services from using the corporate form or that of 
a voluntary association, so that such a prohibition could also be 
declared unconstitutional, assuming first amendment protections are 
applicable. 81 
This analysis, however, reveals the second problem: statutory 
provisions such as section 280 do not prohibit all free legal service 
associations, whereas the Virginia statute barred all solicitation. 
Section 280 merely prohibits corporate practice of law for the poor 
which is carried on without obtaining a court authorization to do 
so. Yet this, in effect, amounts to the imposition of a licensing re-
quirement, and it has been established that whenever licensing is 
a prerequisite to the exercise of first amendment rights there must 
be explicitly defined standards if condemnation as an unconstitu-
tional prior restraint is to be avoided.82 A case in point is Cantwell 
v. Connecticut, 83 where the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional 
as a prior restraint on the freedom of religion a statute requiring 
any person soliciting money for a religious cause to procure first a 
certificate from an official who had the power to determine whether 
the cause was actually religious. There was an admitted state interest 
in the prevention of fraud, but the statute was nevertheless held 
unconstitutional as applied because of the lack of specific standards 
and the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory application.84 The 
appellate division's discretion under section 280 to determine what 
is professionally acceptable is no more limited by specific guidelines 
than that of the official in Cantwell and is equally susceptible to 
arbitrary application. Moreover, the fact that a court is exercising 
81. Even if the group could use the unique form of a nonprofit law partnership, 
such an organization presents a number of problems. First, it would probably be 
difficult to find qualified program directors. Few lawyers would be willing to join a 
partnership with persons they might not even know, face unlimited personal liability, 
and yet receive no compensation for their services. While it is true that malpractice 
insurance could reduce the risk of liability by affording protection against suits for 
misrepresentation, it would not provide a shield against actions for debt or for other 
torts. Second, a law partnership would face grave ethical problems if it sought to 
include laymen as the OEO seems to require. Canon 33 provides in part: 
In the formation of partnerships for the practice of law, no person should be 
admitted or held out as a practitioner or member who is not a member of the 
li:gal profession duly authorized to practice, and amenable to professional disci-
pline. 
Third, a law partnership might lose the favorable tax treatment of a charitable 
corporation, although it is possible that such tax advantages might nevertheless be 
obtained through the use of charitable trusts. Finally, a partnership, lacking the per-
petual existence and ease of executive-management control of a corporation, would 
seem a cumbersome means of managing the kind of vast legal service contemplated 
by the New York program. _ 
82. See Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 
(1938); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
83. 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
84. Id. at 303-07. 
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this discretion rather than an administrative official would not free 
it from the condemnation of being a prior restraint. 85 
Although not exhaustive, the above discussion at least suggests 
that in light of the facts and possible implications of the Button and 
Brotherhood decisions legal service programs under the OEO may 
be within the scope of the first amendment, and that statutory pro-
visions like section 280, because they lack clearly defined standards, 
may be unconstitutional prior restraints. On the other hand, statutes 
of this type, if narrowly drawn, are a proper exercise of the state's 
police power, since maintaining and fostering standards of com-
petence and professional ethics in the practice of law are legitimate 
state concerns. Thus, if states wish to retain such restrictions, 86 clear 
and specific criteria enunciating what is necessary to obtain a license 
should be established.87 This would be wise not only to avoid any 
possible first amendment problems, but also because it would neces-
sitate a thorough investigation of today's social realities and of what 
is needed to preserve professional competence and integrity in legal 
aid work as well as in other types of practices. It is to be hoped that 
the criteria enacted would eliminate the opportunities for dis-
cretional abuse and exclude only those groups actually posing a 
threat to ethical standards. While this will be a difficult task, it is 
better to undertake it through legislative reform after a complete 
and searching analysis, than by means of constitutional litigation 
which seldom leaves a court the time or the resources for deep study 
and unhurried reflection. 
85. "A statute authorizing previous restraint upon that exercise of the guaranteed 
freedom by judicial decision after trial is as obnoxious to the Constitution as one pro-
viding for like restraint by administrative action." Id. at 306. See also Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
86. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 415 (1954); W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 30-2-5 (1966) 
(allowing charitable corporations to practice law for indigents without a special court 
approval); R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 11-27-18 (1956); WASH. REv. CODE §§ 2.50.010-.150 
(1959) (making special provision allowing legal aid to operate). 
87. In setting these standards, the need for close association with other professional 
and nonprofessional services, realistic and flexible standards of indigency, the use of 
law students and laymen in investigating and interviewing, the extent of social and 
political involvement, the representation of groups and unpopular causes, and the 
position of research, drafting, and lobbying for legislative reforms are all aspects that 
should be considered and given ample opportunity for growth and development. 
Finally, several of the canons, such as those concerning advertising, fomenting litiga-
tion, and lay intermediaries will require a critical evaluation in order to determine 
whether they protect professional standards in legal services for indigents or instead 
act as impediments to the legal profession's provision of legal services for the poor. 
J. CARLIN, LAWYERS' ETHICS 180-81 (1966); H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 161-67 (1953); 
Cheatham, A Lawyer When Needed: Legal Services for the Middle Class, 63 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 973, 979 (1965); McCracken, Report on Observances of the Bar of Stated Pro-
fessional Standards, 37 VA. L. REv. 399 (1951); Powell, The Response of the Bar, 51 
A.B.A.J. 751, 781 (1965). A Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards was 
authorized by the House of Delegates in 1964, 50 A.B.A.J. 970 (1965). 
